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A B S T R A C T   
Social media provide novel opportunities for street gangs to operate beyond their traditional borders to sell 
drugs, recruit members and control their territory, virtually and physically. Although social media have 
contributed to the means available to street gangs today, it does not mean that every gang agrees on their use. 
Drawing on different perspectives (ex-gang members, law enforcement) on gangs using a multi-method design in 
a London borough, the current study shows that social media have polarized gangs, resulting in two distinct types 
of digital adaptation. The proposed division of ‘digitalist’ and ‘traditionalist’ gangs is rooted in Thrasher’s (1927) 
dictum that no two gangs are alike and explains how some gangs prefer to keep a low profile, thus, avoiding 
social media use. ‘Digitalists’, by contrast, prefer to use social media as a way to gain reputation and territorial 
expansion. They use it to brand themselves and to appear attractive for recruits and customers alike. These 
differences can be theoretically explained firstly as a generational gap, meaning that younger gang members 
prefer the use of social media; and secondly, by how well established a gang already is, as newer gangs need more 
attention to establish themselves.   
1. Introduction 
The ‘father’ of gang research, Frederic Thrasher (1927, p. 5), 
famously observed that “no two gangs are just alike” and for nearly a 
century, empirical research on gangs has confirmed Thrasher’s “endless 
variety of forms.” The question at the heart of this study is whether 
Thrasher’s criminological maxim holds for the ways in which gangs 
have adapted to meet the demands and opportunities of social media. 
This paper examines the impact of digital technologies on street gangs 
and the stakeholders who interact with them, from gang members to 
victims, and consumers of gang artefacts to control agents. Drawing on 
unique data from a multi-method study conducted in London, England, 
this paper examines for the first time how social media shape not only 
gang member behaviors on the individual level, but gang behaviors on 
the group level. One of the key dilemmas that gangs are facing today is 
whether or not to embrace social media for their potential reputational 
benefits or to shun them owing to the danger of exposure that can 
backfire. While this is a problem gangs share with other social media 
users, the stakes in illicit networks are presumably higher (Gambetta, 
2009) as beyond law enforcement predation, gang members are at an 
elevated risk for violent victimization (Katz, Webb, Fox, & Shaffer, 
2011). 
Gang research has experienced an “international turn” in recent 
years, and since about 2008, “the study of gangs was no longer the study 
of gangs in the United States” (Pyrooz & Mitchell, 2015, p. 43). For 
example, in 2008, John Pitts published Reluctant Gangsters: The Changing 
Face of Youth Crime, the first study to challenge the prevailing wisdom 
that Britain was characterized only by resistant youth subcultures but 
not by violent street gangs (e.g., Campbell & Muncer, 1989). Drawing on 
qualitative research in the London borough of Waltham Forest, Pitts 
(2008) offered a theoretical explanation centered on the impact of 
globalization and the concentration of poverty in deprived neighbor-
hoods, which acted as crucibles for gang activity. Pitts argued that gangs 
had evolved out of traditional youth group structures and young people 
were pragmatically joining them in an effort to negotiate the harsh re-
alities of an increasingly violent, territorial, street life. 
Coincidently, 2008 was also the year the second generation iPhone 
entered the UK market and Apple introduced the App Store—its 
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distribution platform for third-party applications like social media. Pitts. 
(2008) study of gangs made literally no mention at all of smart phones 
and social media. However, subsequent research has found UK gangs use 
popular platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, 
and Twitter to boast about their affiliations and to antagonize their ri-
vals, whether in choreographed drill music videos or spontaneous posts 
of everyday life (Densley, 2013; Irwin-Rogers & Pinkney, 2017; Pinkney 
& Robinson-Edwards, 2018; Storrod & Densley, 2017). 
Further, in the decade since Pitts. (2008) study, the online activities 
of Britain’s gang members have come under increased public scrutiny. 
HM Government’s (2018) newly adopted Serious Violence Strategy 
explicitly singled out social media for glamorizing gang life, escalating 
gang tensions, and normalizing weapon carrying. Social media also are 
described as the central organizing feature of the “county lines” model of 
drug distribution which describes the fact that today gangs traffic drugs 
outside of traditional, local, territorial boundaries (Coomber & Moyle, 
2018; McLean, Robinson, & Densley, 2020; Robinson, McLean, & 
Densley, 2019; Storrod & Densley, 2017). 
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that in the past decade social 
media have completely changed the ways in which gangs and gang 
members communicate and organize themselves. However, there is still 
a tacit assumption in both official reporting and the existing scholarship 
that all gangs are created equal when it comes to social media adapta-
tion; which seems unlikely given Thrasher (1927) dictum and what we 
know about (a) the digital generation gap in other (non-gang) contexts 
(Ofcom, 2017) and (b) the “complicated” social lives youth live on social 
media more generally (Boyd, 2014). 
The novel contribution of this research is that it examines percep-
tions of how social media have affected gangs, from the perspective of 
five distinct types of study participants: ex-gang members, gang-affected 
youth, police officers and criminal justice workers, local authority 
workers (community safety, education, early help and terrorism pre-
vention) and voluntary sector grassroots workers. This multi-method 
study used interviews, focus groups and documentary analysis and 
was conducted in the same London borough as the Pitts (2008) study, 
thus providing a unique opportunity to look back at how, if at all, social 
media have changed gang behavior. Our aim was to study the extent to 
which social media were present in the gang landscape and how they 
were used by street gangs. We specifically aimed to investigate how 
gangs approach the opportunities and challenges presented by social 
media and how they adapt to new digital technologies, neither of which 
have been addressed in previous research. In our study we found that 
different gangs in the same geographical space used social media very 
differently. The current study analyzed what this means for gang activity 
and the construction of gang territory and gang identity—key defining 
features of gangs (Thrasher, 1927; Valasik & Tita, 2018). In the 
following sections we address the underlying theoretical framework and 
develop the hypotheses guiding the multi-method study presented here. 
1.1. Gangs and social media 
For over a decade now, gangs have existed in a digital world (for a 
review, see Pyrooz & Moule, 2019) and gang members have started 
using the internet to showcase and promote gang culture and construct 
gang identities (Morselli & Decary-Hetu, 2013; Moule, Pyrooz, & 
Decker, 2014). Gangs use social media for a variety of reasons (Storrod 
& Densley, 2017), from reputation building and identity construction 
(Urbanik & Haggerty, 2018; Van Hellemont, 2012) to posting threats 
and inciting violence (e.g., Johnson & Schell-Busey, 2016; Lauger & 
Densley, 2018; Lauger, Densley, & Moule, 2019; Moule, Decker, & 
Pyrooz, 2017; Patton et al., 2017b, 2017c, 2019). Recent research found 
that a notable proportion of the violent posturing gangs engage in online 
does not in fact, lead to real-world violence (Stuart, 2019). Still, for 
many gang members, the “digital street” (Lane, 2019) has become “as 
meaningful and consequential as the physical street” (Lauger & Densley, 
2018, p. 817), evidenced in more recent studies in this area (Moule et al., 
2014, 2013; Pyrooz, Decker, & Moule, 2015; Urbanik & Haggerty, 
2018). 
As yet unexplored in the literature is the extent and the ways in 
which different gangs, especially gangs in close conflict or physical 
proximity, adapt to social media and why. No two gangs are the same 
(Thrasher, 1927) and we expect this is also true when it comes to social 
media use. There are a variety of gang types (Klein & Maxson, 2006) and 
evidence that gangs evolve over time owing to a combination of internal 
and external factors (Ayling, 2011; Densley, 2014; McLean, 2018; Roks 
& Densley, 2019; Thrasher, 1927). Gangs “mature” (Gottschalk, 2007), 
for example, moving away from youthful, recreational, non-delinquent 
pursuits (i.e., Thrasher, 1927) to more adult, entrepreneurial, and 
criminal activities (Whittaker et al., 2020). 
The current research, drawing on the perspectives of a variety of 
gang observers, investigated to what extent the evolutionary stage of the 
gang, and the age and the seniority of its members, influenced its rela-
tionship with social media. Specifically, we were interested in under-
standing whether there may be a ‘generation gap’ when it comes to 
gangs’ social media use, and whether early stage gangs and newer gang 
members with tenuous “street capital” (Harding, 2014) may have more 
to gain from “signaling” their reputations online (Densley, 2013) 
compared to more highly evolved, later stage gangs and more senior or 
established gang members. 
Proximity to organized crime may equally affect this relationship 
with technology, with more criminally embedded or discrete groups 
saying no to social media because of its inherent capacity to incriminate 
(Irwin-Rogers, Densley, & Pinkney, 2018). Some gangs may openly use 
social media as a means of advertising, whereas others may eschew it as 
attracting unwanted attention. Social media content, such a good rap 
video, can promote a fearsome reputation that will warn off competitors 
and create ‘brand’ recognition for the gang (Lauger & Densley, 2018). 
However, over exposure online creates online “collateral” (Storrod & 
Densley, 2017) that is liable to get the gang in trouble, either with rival 
gangs or with police (see also, Gambetta, 2009). 
1.2. Social identity and the sense of belonging in social media 
Given that a substantial part of gangs consists of young people in 
their teens and early twenties (Pyrooz & Sweeten, 2015), it is worth 
looking into the promotional side of online gang business more closely 
(Martinez-Ruiz & Moser, 2019). There is a body of research into how 
social media can provide a platform for self-expression and social 
interaction (Hall, 2018) that create a sense of belonging and joint 
identity. Teens and young adults are likely to be particularly responsive 
to this, not only because they are ‘digital natives’ but also because they 
are at a life stage when finding one’s identity and place in the world 
outside of their immediate family is central to becoming an adult 
(Erikson, 1968; Sudbery & Whittaker, 2018). Conformity with group 
norms and being accepted by peers can be particularly important at that 
age and this can be compounded by deindividuation effects of digital 
media (Kim & Park, 2011; Moser & Axtell, 2013). Teenagers’ need to 
belong for instance has been shown to predict their use of social media 
and also their willingness to engage in collective action such as flash 
mobs (Seo et al., 2014). 
Social media participation is also central to building a reputation and 
gaining social status among peers (Bacev-Giles & Haji, 2017), not only 
but especially for young people. Being liked on social media and having 
a large online network is often equated with social status among peers, 
despite empirical evidence that people overestimate online status cues 
(Bradley, Roberts, & Preston, 2019). Based on this previous research, we 
assumed that gangs using social media and portraying themselves as 
attractive in-group and point of social identification for teens (Hogg, 
2001) are particularly attractive to that age group also for reasons that 
are not directly gang related but have more to do with coming of age in a 
society where social media provide one of the most important platforms 
for social interaction and self-expression. This, in turn, could feed into a 
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‘generation gap’ in gang members’ use of social media, with younger 
and older gang members having different levels of engagement with 
social media, bearing in mind that group identity, group process, and 
reputation-building are all central to gangs and in gang research (e.g. 
Decker, Melde, & Pyrooz, 2013; Densley & Peterson, 2016; Felson, 2006; 
Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). 
1.3. Hypotheses 
According to Bechmann & Lomborg (2013), social media provide 
two major avenues of value creation: firstly, economic and 
socio-political value creation by exerting power, exploiting others and 
creating business revenue; and secondly, value creation as 
sense-making, by offering opportunities for self-expression and for 
building and managing social relationships. With this in mind, we 
advance the exploratory hypothesis that gangs make use of all of these 
opportunities to create value, but that their specific use of social media 
depends on the maturity of the gang and its evolutionary stage as well as 
the gang member composition. We hypothesize specifically that: 
H1. older gang members and more mature/more evolved gangs will 
utilize social media less for their activities because they already have 
strong reputations, thus have less to gain and more to lose from social 
media attention; 
H2. younger gang members and less mature/less evolved gangs will 
use the full range of social media opportunities available to build up 
their reputations because they have more to gain and less to lose from 
doing so. 
To elaborate on the hypotheses, less established gangs have a far 
greater need to use social media for both “expressive” and “instrumental” 
purposes than their more established counterparts (Storrod & Densley, 
2017). First, to create a gang identity and build a reputation by pro-
moting events, music, and videos that speak to their members and 
provide a social platform for interaction and identification. This can 
provide opportunities to not only gain members but also to retain them 
and to advertise events and distribution points for selling drugs and sex. 
Second, to issue threats and send territorial signals to rival gangs and to 
establish control of members and distributors on the ground. Social 
media provide comparatively low risk opportunities to establish new 
territories, gain membership, and set up drug distribution networks, 
compared to potentially very costly physical confrontations and controls 
on the ground (Densley, 2013). If this does not work, less evolved gangs 
can still revert to traditional, physical means of threat and control and 
can close down any social media activities quickly. 
2. Methods 
2.1. The study context 
The present study was commissioned by Waltham Forest, the same 
local authority in London, England, which was the focus of Pitts, (2008) 
study, after a series of particularly violent gang-related murders, which 
suggested that there had been changes in how gangs operated that 
required further research and analysis. The findings relating to general 
changes in gang composition and activity have been discussed elsewhere 
(Whittaker et al., 2018). The present research is focused specifically on 
social media use and gang evolution. 
2.2. Research design 
The research design was comprised of two-stages and was multi- 
method, with three distinct research methods: interviews, focus 
groups, and document analysis. The first stage consisted of qualitative 
semi-structured interviews (n  31) with ex-gang members, gang- 
affected youth, police officers and criminal justice workers, local 
authority workers (community safety, education, early help and 
terrorism prevention) and voluntary sector grassroots workers. This was 
combined with a document analysis of information from local agencies. 
Once the entire dataset at stage one was analyzed and preliminary 
findings were developed, this was followed by a second stage to test 
these preliminary findings with two large focus groups (n  19 and n 
18) of key stakeholders from police and criminal justice agencies, local 
government agencies and the voluntary sector grass roots organizations. 
2.3. Sample and participants 
The first stage included individual interviews with 21 professionals 
from the police and criminal justice agencies (24%), local government 
agencies in community safety, education, early help and terrorism pre-
vention (38%) and voluntary sector grassroots organizations (38%). 
Interviews were also held with 10 young people, including individual 
interviews with four males who had very recently left gangs and a group 
interview with four young women and two young men were not 
embedded gang members but had extensive knowledge of local gang 
activity and were recruited by the local authority. Further demographic 
information has not been provided in order to protect the identity of 
participants. Former gang members were recruited from local grassroots 
gang intervention agencies, who had been involved in supporting their 
recent gang exit. 
We have used the term ‘former gang member’ to denote people who 
had some level of embeddedness in street gangs within the preceding 12 
months and who self-nominated as former gang members. The in-
dividuals interviewed represented a range of different gangs and some 
still retained strong social “ties” to the gangs they had been involved 
with (Pyrooz, Decker, & Webb, 2014). The study used the definition 
used in the Dying to Belong report (CSJ, 2009) with five key features: A 
relatively durable, predominantly street-based group of young people 
who: (1) see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group; 
(2) engage in a range of criminal activity and violence; (3) identify with 
or lay claim over territory; (4) have some form of identifying structural 
features; and (5) are in conflict with other, similar, gangs (Centre for 
Social Justice, 2009, p.48). This definition was shared with all in-
terviewees to ensure perceptions of ‘gangs’ were consistent. For a 
detailed description of the gangs under investigation and the broader 
contextual factors that lead to gang emergence and involvement in 
Waltham Forest, please see Whittaker et al. (2018). 
In line with university ethical protocols that approved the current 
study, we were unable to interview any active gang members, and only 
allowed to include ex-gang members and gang affected youth. This was a 
compromise over fears that gang members’ participation in the study 
might endanger researchers and interviewees alike. This does pose some 
obvious limitations which we address in the discussion. 
In an effort to address some of these concerns, the dataset was sup-
plemented with a document analysis of data related to gangs and held by 
local services. This provided useful historical data on specific gangs, 
spanning over a decade, including previous offences and local intelli-
gence. We took a critical stance towards this data, seeking corroboration 
through multiple sources and recognized that more recent data was 
often poorer quality as suspects were becoming increasingly reluctant to 
self-identify as gang members and actively seeking to hide their 
activities. 
The second stage consisted of two large focus groups (n  19 and n 
18) with key people from local governmental agencies, criminal justice 
and grassroots organizations to test the finding from the preliminary 
analysis of Stage 1. The aim of this stage was to ensure that we were not 
imposing external interpretations and to ensure that the findings were 
corroborated by local stakeholders who worked with street gangs on a 
daily basis. 
A. Whittaker et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Computers in Human Behavior 110 (2020) 106403
4
2.4. Data analysis 
Both the interviews in Stage 1 and the focus groups discussions in 
Stage 2 were transcribed and the resulting data coded using the NVivo 
11 qualitative data analysis software package. Data from the first stage 
were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach developed by Braun 
and Clarke (2006) as this is an established process to analyze interview, 
focus group, and documentary data. After familiarization with the data, 
initial semantic coding was completed across the data set, focused on 
what a participant explicitly said and/or what was written. Initial codes 
were then reviewed to identify latent themes—the underlying ideas and 
assumptions that shape and inform the semantic content of the data-
—and to explore the relationship between themes. These themes were 
then reviewed by the research team to ensure consistency within each 
theme and across the whole dataset (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
At the second stage, the process was repeated as data from the focus 
groups were analyzed using the same thematic analysis approach. The 
coding for the data from the first stage was reviewed and recoded in the 
light of coding from the second stage. At both stages, the research team 
found acceptable levels of agreement between different participants, 
despite the diversity of their backgrounds. The resulting themes are 
captured by the different subheadings in the Findings section below. 
2.5. Ethics 
Ethical approval was obtained from the first author’s university 
ethics committee. Note, any research on gangs that leaves out crime 
“leaves out a critical part of the phenomenon” (Sanchez-Jankowski, 
1991, p. 16), but we were very clear with our interviewees that we 
would never disclose identifying details of criminal activity (e.g., dates, 
addresses, and victim profiles) and in line with ethical requirements we 
have written up the findings responsibly to ensure they do not become a 
blueprint for how gangs could use social media to advance their material 
personal interests. This is information gang members and practitioners 
already possess and could have reported if they were so inclined. 
Like in Pitts. (2008) study in Waltham Forest, interviewees were 
identified and accessed via a combined purposive and snowball sam-
pling technique that started with frontline practitioners in outreach 
projects acting as gatekeepers. Participation in the study was voluntary 
and predicated on the active and informed consent of all research par-
ticipants. All research participants were informed about the procedures 
and risks involved in the research and appropriate steps were taken to 
mitigate any risk of harm pursuant to their participation. For example, 
great care was taken to protect the confidentiality of all participants, 
particularly the former gang members because of the (albeit minimal) 
risk of retribution. This included separate interviews in settings that 
participants felt were safe for them. We have used the real names of the 
gangs in the borough in this paper, but these are well known already also 
in the general media and in research (see Whittaker et al., 2018) and in a 
borough comprised of 275,000 residents plus many more commuters 
and tourists, chances of identification are slim. Transcripts were care-
fully anonymized and, to protect respondents’ identities, only restricted 
demographic information about the participants has been included. 
2.6. Findings 
The central overall result of the current study was that gangs 
demonstrated a sharp division in their attitudes towards and use of so-
cial media which could be clearly identified as two types of adaptation to 
social media. Whilst some were ‘digitalists’ who embraced technology as 
a means of conducting business and developing the gang’s identity, 
others were ‘traditionalists’ who eschewed social media as too risky and 
‘bad for business’. Further key findings were a noted difference between 
younger and older gang members in their relationship with social media 
and the fact that social media completely changed the traditional 
meaning that territory for gangs. Below the results are presented 
according to these central categories identified in the data. 
2.7. Logged off: the ‘traditionalist’ Model of Gang Adaptation 
Some gangs in the study adopted an operating model that prioritized 
maintaining a low profile to avoid police attention and to reduce the risk 
of evidence that can be used against them. A former member of one of 
the most criminally embedded gangs in the area, the Mali Boys, 
confirmed this attitude towards social media: 
No, no, social media definitely don’t play no part because everyone keeps 
away from social media … [Mali Boys] keep away from social media, 
yeah. Everyone keeps away from social media to be honest because they 
are paranoid of the state. The police can go through your phone, this 
person can go through your phone … do you know what I mean? 
(Participant 28, ex-gang member). 
As well as concerns about smart phones that can be used as evidence 
following arrest, there were other examples of gang members being 
caught out through social media. For example, a criminal justice pro-
fessional described visiting a family about concerns that a young boy 
was involved in a local gang: 
We go round there and see them and their mum, I say … we’re concerned 
about your 13-year-old son and the mum says, my son’s not in a gang, 
you’re just picking on him, which often happens. I say, ‘well this is my 
laptop, have a look at this YouTube video and tell me if you recognize 
anyone in this’ and there’s her son, at the front, spliff in his mouth, 
holding a knife, hood up, I’ll ‘F’ you up. (Participant 16, criminal justice 
sector professional). 
Of course, featuring in or sharing a YouTube video—even with 
claims of ‘gang life’—is not a legitimate or concrete indicator of real-life 
gang involvement, and should not be interpreted as such by law 
enforcement (Lane, Ramirez, & Pearce, 2018; Patton et al., 2017a). Prior 
research demonstrates a gap between gang impressions and pre-
sentations online and actual gang behaviors (Stuart, 2019; Urbanik & 
Haggerty, 2018; Van Hellemont, 2012). Still, law enforcement agencies 
had used information collected from social media platforms in order to 
track perceived gang membership and activities (see Densley & Pyrooz, 
2019). For example, there had been a period when police officers 
discovered that Facebook could be used as a means of gaining intelli-
gence information about potential gang members and their associates: 
At one stage you could get loads of information from that because it had a 
list of all their friends, their profiles were open. And then they just, it just 
all got shut down and then basically you’ve lost all that information so 
it’s, there’s a period where they’re utilizing it, law enforcement catches up 
to that, catches on, there’s a period when they’re like actually it works, 
law enforcement is brilliant and then they change their use of it and they 
don’t post stupid things on social media now (Participant 12, local 
government professional) 
This incident had contributed towards Facebook being referred to as 
‘Fedbook’ (Densley, 2013, p. 99). 
Surveillance and use of social media by law enforcement and crim-
inal justice practitioners has changed over the last ten years, shaping 
some of the perceptions discussed herein. In the past, when police were 
unable to follow and watch social media, young people had far more 
latitude to exploit it for criminal use. But in recent years, restrictions on 
surveillance have been lifted and supported under the rubric of proac-
tive violence prevention (Densley & Pyrooz, 2019). As police powers 
increased over the internet, gang members may have gotten wise to this 
and changed their approach by moving to more private streams. Indeed, 
the research even uncovered that young gang members working county 
lines drug deals for gangs that were social media ‘traditionalists’ were 
given old style Nokia phones when they were recruited in an attempt to 
leave less of a digital footprint that could be used as incriminating 
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evidence, such as photographs. Similarly, young people would receive 
instructions through telephone calls because text messages were deemed 
more incriminating. 
It is important to not assume that gangs were adopting a ‘tradition-
alist’ stance simply because they were not tech savvy. The gang that best 
exemplified this stance, the Mali Boys, saw social media as an instru-
ment that could be weaponized either to be used against them or that 
they could use against their opponents. It could be used against the gang 
in the sense that it could provide criminal justice agencies with 
incriminating evidence on their phones. However, the gang could use 
social media as a weapon against the police in the sense that they used it 
as an integral part of their surveillance activities on police officers. 
Campana and Varese (2018) argue that if a gang can generate fear in 
a community and corrupt legal figures then it is beginning to ‘govern’ 
illicit production and exchange. The Mali Boys, a gang that has evolved 
from a reactional gang into a serious organized crime group (Whittaker 
et al., 2018)), used social media to gather information about the per-
sonal lives of police officers, which they could then use to intimidate 
individual officers. This was confirmed by a senior police officer: 
But the Mali Boys seem to have a business model and are a much more 
professional outfit. And that manifests itself in many different ways, such 
as the intelligence collection they do on officers. So they try and intimidate 
officers by collecting number plates etc and going on social media. 
(Participant 11, criminal justice professional). 
The Mali Boys also used mobile phone technology to place spotters at 
strategic places to warn others of any police presence. In order to be 
successful at this stage of gang evolution, the Mali Boys needed to have 
to have an informational advantage in order to stay one step ahead of 
any rival gangs and the police. 
2.8. Logged On: The ‘Digitalist’ Model of Gang Adaptation 
During the study, the use of social media platforms such as Snapchat 
and Instagram were described as being some of the new tools that gang 
members use to communicate with each other: 
Social media’s enabled people to communicate. I mean originally, it was 
more around people using BBM to message people but it’s much more 
sophisticated now so I’m just wary of that, every young person’s got a 
smart phone. (Participant 9, pan-London criminal justice 
professional). 
But more than that, the second model of adaptation, ‘digitalist,’ was 
one where gangs embraced social media and used it as a means of 
promoting the gang, including their drug dealing activities: 
Yeah, back in the day it was different, it was different. Nowadays people 
are getting … everyone’s watching their videos of gangs so they want to be 
involved in it. (Participant 27, former gang member). 
One of the main gangs using this approach is the DM Crew (originally 
named after local areas that they controlled but also known as 
‘Dangerous Minds’). This gang is relatively new, to the extent it was not 
identified in the original Pitts (2008) study of the borough. During the 
period of the fieldwork, members of the DM Crew were featured in a 
music video on well-known former BBC Radio DJ Tim Westwood’s 
YouTube channel, which has 1 million subscribers. Other newer, less 
evolved gangs, such as Chingford Hall and Priory Court also have a 
notable internet presence on social networking sites. 
Gangs have increasingly realized that more open social media plat-
forms such as Facebook could be used as evidence against them, so they 
had learnt to use end-to-end encrypted forms of social media such as 
Snapchat, as well as closed groups in WhatsApp, as a means of 
communication because they are aware that these are less likely to be 
monitored by law enforcement agencies. Gangs took advantage of the 
temporary nature of images in social media platforms such as Snapchat 
to advertise the sales of drugs without leaving incriminating evidence: 
They use Snapchat to film and sell what they’re selling. So it might be that 
they’ve got some drugs that they want to sell and they might publish that 
on Snapchat: ‘So this is what I’ve got at the moment’, so that people can 
see what they can buy (Participant 8, local government professional). 
Gangs that have embraced social media and technology more 
broadly have also realized its potential for exploitation and coercive 
control. GPS location tags and popular apps such as Find My iPhone or 
Find My Friends were used to keep junior gang members in constant 
contact, particularly as they travelled far from home per the county lines 
model of drug dealing. Junior gang members may be asked by senior 
gang members to provide photo or video evidence of their journeys, 
their surroundings, and their activities. This round-the-clock surveil-
lance, known as “remote mothering” but tantamount to remote con-
trolling (Storrod & Densley, 2017), makes it difficult for young people to 
focus on anything other than the gang or to seek help without arousing 
suspicion from gang leaders. 
Practitioners described how they struggled to keep up with the 
rapidly evolving nature of technology and social media: 
The older generation or people who are just law enforcement aren’t up to 
date with the youngsters of today about what’s happening and going on … 
There must be communication in some way, how they’re doing that is a bit 
of mystery because if it’s, if you’re not being exposed or given that in-
formation you’re never going to know kind of thing (Participant 12, 
criminal justice professional). 
It’s trying to keep up with them, we’ll never be ahead of them, they’ll 
always be catching up with it and I think we were slow with the social 
media kind of thing (Participant 16, criminal justice professional). 
It might seem that the two approaches are incompatible, and it 
would be difficult for gangs with different orientations to work together. 
However, the DM Crew were part of a business alliance with the Mali 
Boys, working under their umbrella while maintaining a separate 
identity. 
2.9. A generation gap? 
Some of the findings above can be explained by differences between 
younger and older gang members in their roles and approaches to social 
media. As observed in prior research (Storrod & Densley, 2017), videos 
posted on YouTube tend to feature younger, more junior, gang members, 
who have most to gain in establishing their reputation. The videos tend 
not to feature the most senior members of the gang, who have already 
established their reputations and prefer to maintain a low public profile 
to avoid police attention. One participant stated: 
Notably you don’t get the upper gang members in the pyramid featuring, 
it’s all the lower tier (Participant 16, criminal justice professional). 
Participants explained this difference between younger and older 
gang members in terms of their motivation: 
The olders were making money, you recognized that but … for the 
youngers it’s all about respect (Participant 47, grass roots organization 
professional). 
It’s about money for elders and that money is kept coming in by control 
and status but the youngers, they just want the status. And if they thought 
more about the money then maybe they wouldn’t behave in the way they 
do because stabbing someone over stepping on your trainer or looking at 
you in a funny way is going to send you to prison and you’re not making 
any money, so I think they’ve yet to grasp that concept (Participant 7, 
voluntary sector professional). 
Some of this carried over to the age of gangs themselves. For younger 
gangs, social media provide a means of enhancing their ‘brand name’, 
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enabling them to increase awareness of their products in drug markets, 
recruit junior members and protect their markets against other sup-
pliers. One participant explained how social media make drug markets 
attractive to others as part of a wider materialist culture: 
People just watch social media and want to be like social media … The 
drugs culture for me is what we see on social media, everybody wants 
money, it’s materialist, innit? (Participant 20, former gang affiliate). 
Storrod and Densley (2017) identified a recent trend with London 
gangs reaching out beyond their localized social networks to a larger 
digital audience by posting ‘trap rap’ videos (a form of hip-hop music 
that focuses on drug dealing from ‘trap houses’) on YouTube. They 
studied videos from a number of different London gangs, including 
videos of gang members going out ‘on holiday’ to seaside and rural 
towns as part of developing county lines operations (Coomber & Moyle, 
2018). The first purpose that this served was to scare and warn off 
existing local drug suppliers. One criminal justice professional stated: 
A lot of these YouTube videos show these kids in London gangs being very, 
very aggressive, very, very threatening so if you are some kid from Ipswich 
watching YouTube, which is what they do, and you see the Chingford 
Hall, one of their videos saying we’ve got guns, we’ve got knives, we do 
this and then you hear on the street that they’re the ones coming out 
selling the drugs, you are going to shit yourself and stay away … So 
definitely it is money motivated, the demand’s there, they supply it and the 
lack of strong opposition in those areas to do it (Participant 16, criminal 
justice professional). 
The second purpose of these videos was to advertise their products to 
potential local customers through promoting the ‘brand identity’ of their 
drugs business. One former gang member argued that rap music served 
to ‘program’ young people, drawing them in and provoking (‘gassing’) 
them into an overexcited state: 
And the worse thing about it: they’ve got their headphones into you, 
twenty-four hours a day. As soon as they wake up, slap on their stereo. 
They start programming. Especially when you’re waking up every 
morning; you put your stereo on and you’re listening to the gang music. 
When you leave your house, you’ve got your headphones in and all you’re 
listening to is, ‘Stab man this … ’ ‘Rob man that … ’ ‘Selling this’, ‘Selling 
that’ … And you’re getting gassed, just being hooked (Participant 29, ex- 
gang member). 
The jury is out whether gang music is directly related to acts of 
violence (Kubrin & Nielson, 2014; Stuart, 2019), but the participant 
went on to describe how they felt that this creates a mind-set that is 
advantageous to gangs because it recruits young people into the business 
of the gang: 
And then, all of a sudden, you’ve got this negative mindset where you 
genuinely feel like – to yourself – ‘All I can do is sell drugs. I can’t get a 
job.’ And you think to yourself … But, when you look at that person, you 
think, ‘You haven’t applied for a job yet.’ ‘You’ve never, ever applied for a 
job but you feel like you can’t get one. Why is that? Because of the shit 
that you’re listening and programming yourself with is telling you 
(Participant 29, ex-gang member). 
2.10. The changing nature of gang territory and street capital in the age of 
social media 
Territory has always played an important role in the history of gang 
life (Valasik & Tita, 2018) and the development of the internet has 
provided a virtual space in which gang members can interact and foster 
collective identity without the need for face-to-face interactions (Lauger 
& Densley, 2018; Stuart, 2019). A decade ago, Pitts (2008) found that 
London gangs used color codes and other conventional signals to display 
their identity. With the advent of social media, gangs no longer needed 
to “represent” in person — gang identity was now communicated online: 
‘ … they all had their own colors, they’d wear bandanas and such like and 
also graffiti, you’d get tags marking out areas and so on. You’ve seen a 
decline in both of those things because of social media, so you don’t need 
to, you don’t need to walk around with a red bandana on writing 
Chingford Boys E4 on walls everywhere because all you do is film a grime 
track which is the genre that they identify with at the moment and the 
lyrics, when they are MCing the lyrics, are all about territories, access to 
firearms, how much money they’re making, how they get the girl, how 
they’re going to shank you if you come in their area and such like and 
that’s viewed by hundreds of thousands of people globally. They all know 
each other’s faces, they all know who’s who via social media so that’s 
why you don’t see colors anymore’ (Participant 16, criminal justice 
professional). 
Gangs identify with a specific territory but this can be in a symbolic 
rather than a physical sense. For example, one of the most well- 
established gangs, the Beaumont Crew, strongly identify with the 
Beaumont Estate but a regeneration of the estate has meant that very few 
members physically live there today. It is a symbolic rather than an 
actual reality and a ‘brand identity’ representing their history and 
strength. 
As Fraser (2015) observed in Scotland, our respondents argued that 
teenagers are less likely to “hang about” in the streets today than in years 
past owing to the growth in technology like social media. A decade ago, 
young people earned gang reputations and “street capital” on the streets 
via public acts of crime and violence (Densley, 2013; Harding, 2014). 
Today, it seems new entrants into the gang game were more likely to 
supplement any physical action with virtual content intentionally 
curated to help build status and gain peer recognition. In other words, 
social media have changed the “routine activities” of gang youth (Pyrooz 
et al., 2015), to the extent that creating a continuous stream of content 
(i.e., attractive posts and events) for broad consumption is now one of 
the duties of gang membership. Such activity makes gang ‘territory’ 
more fluid than ever. However, physical territory often features in 
gangs’ social media content, participants argued, such as when members 
film themselves hanging out in expected surroundings or encroaching 
upon rival territory and vandalizing their property (Densley, 2013). 
Such action is unnecessarily risky for older gang members with banked 
street capital, said our interviewees, but for younger gang members with 
a point to prove, this is precisely the sort of content that could propel 
them to instant stardom on the streets. 
Still, even older gang members are sensitive to public insults (Lauger, 
2012; Papachristos, 2009), thus if their status or turf is threatened or 
insulted online and they cannot sufficiently defend themselves by digital 
means, then the sense of humiliation and shame could mount (Scheff & 
Schorr, 2017), provoking a violent physical response. When actual 
violence happens, social media provide bystanders with the means of 
sharing video footage at no cost to themselves, which can lead to a vi-
cious circle of intergenerational violence—something that was actually 
occurring in Waltham Forest at the time of the study. Slightly over ten 
years ago (Pitts, 2008), fights between street gangs would have had a 
limited number of bystanders and after a violent confrontation, gang 
members would be able to portray the conflict in ways that helped them 
save face, avoid embarrassment and preserve their reputation. Social 
media have changed this completely, with the possibility for almost 
anyone to share and upload content instantly and bring a wider audience 
to interact with gang territory. 
3. Discussion 
The current study examined the ways in which social media have 
influenced changes in street gangs and found a clear distinction between 
‘digitalist’ gangs who embraced social media and ‘traditionalist’ gangs 
who avoided social media. This is an important contribution because 
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there is an assumption in the existing literature that gangs have uni-
formly embraced social media (Moule, Pyrooz, & Decker, 2013). 
Further, how gangs adapt to social media appears contingent upon their 
level of maturity and evolution, with younger, less criminally involved 
groups openly using social media as a means of advertising, while older, 
organized crime gangs eschew it as attracting unwanted attention. The 
findings thus confirm our exploratory hypotheses about gangs’ differ-
ential adaption to social media. Thrasher (1927) was right, no two gangs 
are just alike, including when it comes to social media use. 
The findings also compliment those from prior studies insomuch that 
there is evidence that social media can promote a fearsome reputation 
that will warn off competitors and create brand recognition of the illicit 
goods and services that the gang provides to potential customers. 
However, content posted online tended to feature junior gang members, 
who, like professionals on LinkedIn or celebrities on Twitter, had the 
most to gain from building their brand and “signaling” their reputation 
(Densley, 2013). Senior gang members, by contrast, preferred to main-
tain a low public profile to avoid police attention (see also Disley & 
Liddle, 2016). 
The division between junior and senior gang members can be un-
derstood as two forms of value creation via social media as proposed by 
Bechmann & Lomborg (2013). Since more senior gang members have 
established their reputations and are receiving greater financial re-
wards, their motivation to use social media appear to be more about 
economic and socio-political value creation by exploiting others and 
creating business revenue. Junior gang members have yet to establish 
their reputations and are receiving smaller financial rewards so for them 
social media provide a means of value creation as sense making through 
opportunities for self-expression, including shared social identity, 
friendship and revenge. 
4. Limitations 
As always, there are a number of limitations to this study. Firstly, our 
sample of gang youth is small and while the current study draws on the 
perspectives of police officers, local authority workers, and others, the 
information obtained from them is indirect data about how gangs use 
social media. Different viewpoints provide an important check on val-
idity, but criminal justice professionals are not always best-placed to 
speak to how social media has affected gangs. For ex-gang members, 
there are typical problems of post hoc recall. The rest of our sample can 
really only reveal perceptions relating to gangs’ social media use. Of 
course, narratives about gangs do not always accurately depict the re-
ality of gang life (Lauger, 2012). Law enforcement in London has been 
criticized for overinterpreting social media postings by youth who are 
alleged to be gang-involved (Amnesty International UK, 2018), and 
misunderstanding may be particularly acute for youth of marginalized 
and racialized backgrounds (e.g., Patton et al., 2017a). Owing to our 
approved ethical protocols and an obligation to keep study participants 
safe, interviews with active or embedded gang members were not 
permitted this time, but we hope future research can capture this vital 
perspective. 
Secondly, the study is a 10-year transversal follow up study of gangs 
in the same area of London as Pitts. (2008) study, rather than a longi-
tudinal study with the same individuals. The current study thus provides 
a second snapshot in time, which coincided with the incorporation of 
social media into gang life. This allows us to compare gang functioning 
with and without social media, but it is obviously an imperfect design in 
this sense. 
Thirdly, our focus on gangs in one London borough may limit the 
generalizability of results, not least because gangs are shaped by their 
local and national environments. Again, no two gangs are perfectly alike 
(Thrasher, 1927). 
These limitations notwithstanding, we believe the current study 
provides valuable insights for both academics and practitioners on gang 
strategies of social media adaptation. It certainly raises many important 
and empirically interesting questions about differential adaptations to 
social media, which we hope will feature in future studies of gangs. 
4.1. Implications for research and practice 
One of the main implications for policy is that criminal justice and 
related responses need to consider both ‘traditionalist’ and ‘digitalist’ 
orientations of gangs towards social media. A senior police officer 
described their response to monitor social media daily in order to 
identify developing conflicts between gangs: 
We capture all the videos now, the gang videos … we constantly monitor 
social media. And it’s good for us to monitor those because if we see a 
group on a particular patch talking about mouthing a group, you know, 
the gang that there are next door, we can tell that there’s going to be issues 
and so we police accordingly. (Participant 9, pan-London criminal 
justice professional). 
They went on to describe how they responded: 
We deploy mediators, we gate-keep the forms which the detectives send 
through to us and then we send it out to mediators so they literally knock 
on the doors and say guys, you know, the fall out, what’s the issue? We’re 
not going to tell the police, it’s really about stopping the conflict, so as long 
as they don’t stab each other, we’re well aware that they might still go out 
and do all sorts of other activities but what we’re trying to do is stop 
retaliatory stabbing or a fatality. (Participant 9, pan-London criminal 
justice professional). 
New Scotland Yard has subsequently set up a specialist unit to tackle 
gang-related social-media activity that monitors social media and offers 
mediation. Lane (2019) talks about the merits of such an approach in 
detail, but a former gang member in our sample outlined how mediation 
might be effective: 
I think if there is mediation, someone from that area comes along to talk 
because more times, they don’t really hate each other until it becomes too 
late and they actually build a hate for each other when someone has done 
something to you. (Participant 27, former gang member). 
Recent research suggests that when law enforcement and social 
services monitor social media for warning signs of escalating tensions 
between rival gangs, the escalation of violence can be interrupted 
(Patton, Eschmann, Elsaesser, & Bocanegrad, 2016). Online gang ac-
tivities are also now used to add names to New Scotland Yard’s database 
of purported gang members (the “Gangs Matrix”) (see Densley & Pyrooz, 
2019). While this can help flagging individuals who might benefit from 
mediation or social service intervention, civil liberties groups and 
internet scholars caution that social media are becoming a means of 
surveillance and intelligence gathering for control agents, with the 
danger of activities on social media creating guilt by association (Lane, 
Ramirez, & Pearce, (2018); Patton et al., 2017a). Lest we forget, making 
a music video and uploading and sharing online is an everyday pursuit 
for many young people. The majority of youth who do so are not gang 
members or committing any crimes, yet they are increasingly rendered 
as troublesome and subject to suspicion and censorship. 
Still, the internet is here to stay and social media continue to be a 
vital component for criminally-involved individuals and groups, 
including gangs. This research contributes to our understanding of how 
this happens by examining how gangs use and adapt to social media and 
how this relates to gang member composition and gang evolution over 
time. This knowledge is vital for gang scholars, law enforcement, and 
youth safeguarding, and equally contributes to research on the impact of 
computer use on individuals, groups, and society. 
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